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United States v. Esquenazi: Injecting
Clarity or Confusion into the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act
Amy Lynn Soto*
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was enacted
in 1977 to criminalize the bribing of foreign officials in order to obtain or retain business. In recent years, there has
been an increase in bribery investigations and prosecutions
by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). This increase in enforcement coexists with an ambiguity regarding the scope of the FCPA.
The scope of the FCPA hinges on the determination of
who is a foreign official. The FCPA defines a foreign official
as “any officer or employee of a foreign government or any
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or
department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf
of any such public international organization.” However,
the word “instrumentality” is undefined. Consequently, the
DOJ and SEC have taken great liberties in interpreting the
FCPA and expanding its scope.
In 2014, the Eleventh Circuit became the first appellate
court in the United States to define the ambiguous term in
United States v. Esquenazi. Unfortunately, instead of clarifying the issue, the court defined an instrumentality as “an
entity controlled by the government of a foreign country that
performs a function the controlling government treats as its
own.” In addition, the court proffered a two-prong test with
nine non-dispositive factors and no guidance on how the factors should be applied.
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This note argues that the court’s approach has broadened the scope of the FCPA beyond Congress’ intent and has
resulted in a great deal of uncertainty in interpreting the
statute. As a result of the lack of guidance, individuals and
corporations engaging in international business are operating in a largely uncertain world. This uncertainty inevitably
yields a chilling effect on international business.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
It is estimated that over $1,000,000,000,000 per year is exchanged in bribe payments paid in rich and developing countries.1
This equates to over $273,000 per day and over $11,000 per hour
paid in bribes. As shocking as it may be, this estimate is exclusive
of the embezzlement of public funds or theft of public assets.2 Given
the increase in globalization and pervasiveness of corruption around
the globe, many countries have enacted anti-corruption legislation
to combat the ills of bribery—including the United States.
In 1977, the United States Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) in an effort to remedy the corruption stemming from American individuals and businesses overseas.3 The
FCPA essentially criminalizes the bribing of foreign government officials by American citizens, permanent residents, businesses (both
private and public), and certain non-American individuals and entities in order to obtain or retain business; in other words, the FCPA
set the lofty goal of eliminating “pay to play” practices overseas by
persons with the requisite American nexus. However, the FCPA is
rather aspirational and casts a wide net of enforcement. So wide a
net, in fact, that it borders on being, or is simply in certain instances,
so vague as to be constitutionally defective in its application to certain situations that are increasingly prevalent overseas.
A crucial question requiring an answer prior to the application
of the FCPA to a specific situation is who exactly is a foreign official? That is the question that individuals and professionals engaging in international business have been asking themselves for years.
The FCPA does not proscribe payments made to employees of a
1

The Costs of Corruption, THE WORLD BANK (Apr. 8, 2004),
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20190
187%7EmenuPK:34457%7EpagePK:34370%7EpiPK:34424%7EtheSitePK:4607,00.html (last visited May 1,
2016).
2
See id.
3
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff, 78m(b), (d)(1),
(g)-(h) (2006 & Supp. 2010), amended by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendment of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415 (1988) (codified at
§§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2006)) and the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998) (codified at
§§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2012)).
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commercial enterprise, but it is also silent as to whether employees
of a state-owned or state-controlled business entity constitute foreign officials.
The FCPA defines a foreign official as
any officer or employee of a foreign government or
any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
or of a public international organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of
any such government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public
international organization.4
At first blush, the statute seems to have a rather broad scope.
Further, combing through the various components of the Act shows
that the word “instrumentality” is not defined at all.
The ambiguity is compounded by the fact that the Department
of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) have taken the liberty to enforce the statute as they see fit.
The DOJ and SEC have upped the ante in intensifying their focus on
enforcement. Because most prosecutions settle due to the high
stakes and risk of a potentially lengthy incarceration, courts rarely
have the chance to hear cases pertaining to the FCPA, and as such,
the statute has avoided judicial scrutiny for the most part. This judicial vacuum has allowed the DOJ and SEC to administratively define the scope of the FCPA. The Eleventh Circuit, the first appellate
court to address the issue, had the opportunity to remedy the vagueness associated with the scope of the FCPA; however, it failed to do
so. 5
The court had the opportunity to clarify the ambiguity hovering
over the definition of a foreign official in United States v. Esquenazi.6 Instead, the court punted and did not provide a framework
to determine what an “instrumentality” means under the auspices of
the FCPA and thus, failed to clarify for once and for all who is a

4
5
6

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A) (2012).
United States v. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id.

SUMMER 2016]

UNITED STATES V. ESQUENAZI

387

foreign official.7 Rather, it proffered two tests with nine non-dispositive factors to help determine whether an entity is an instrumentality
under the FCPA.8
The nine factors fail to provide any concrete guidance on an issue of fact that ought to be considered a matter of law. Under the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision, just about any set of facts or circumstances would result in a foreign government being deemed in “control” of a commercial enterprise, and thus, such an enterprise would
be deemed to be an “instrumentality” of the foreign government.
While there are a number of entities that do, indeed, possess varying
degrees of governmental control, the Congress that enacted and
amended the FCPA did not intend that some, and not total, control
of a business enterprise by a foreign government would render the
enterprise an “instrumentality” under the FCPA, as the Eleventh Circuit has effectively decided in Esquenazi. The only way to properly
give effect to Congress’ intent is to abandon Esquenazi.
This note will address the FCPA and the practical implications
of Esquenazi on compliance. The note will begin by providing the
historical basis for the enactment of the FCPA, followed by an explanation of the existence of a judicial vacuum of interpretation of
the FCPA and an examination of the limited case law on the “instrumentality” component of the federal statute. The note will respectfully discuss how, in the author’s opinion, the Eleventh Circuit erred
under an analysis of the text, legislative history, and ultimate purpose of the FCPA. The note will conclude with a discussion of the
potentially deleterious effect of the broadened interpretation of the
FCPA under Esquenazi and what Congress, or the courts, can do to
remedy what may very well be an unintended interpretation of the
FCPA.

7
8

Id.
Id.
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BACKGROUND

A. History
The FCPA was enacted as a result of the political and corporate
abuses revealed by the Watergate scandal.9 The Watergate investigations revealed that American corporations had used slush funds to
make illegal contributions to political campaigns.10 The SEC initiated a broad investigation of corporate business practices, which ultimately revealed that over 400 American companies admitted to
making improper payments abroad.11 The companies included over
117 Fortune 500 companies, and it was estimated that more than
$300 million had been paid in bribes to foreign officials.12 The
American public and the international community were outraged.
American legislators believed that the payment of bribes to influence the acts of foreign government officials was not only unethical but also threatened American businesses and created foreign
policy concerns.13 Senator William Proxmire said, “Bribery undermines fair competition between American firms. Price and quality
no longer control the market. The growth, profitability and employment levels of firms operating in such circumstances are distorted.”14 It was also argued that the payment of bribes placed the
United States in a precarious foreign policy position. Bribery payments embarrassed friendly governments and damaged America’s
public image.15 In a particularly egregious example, Lockheed Corporation paid Japan’s Prime Minister $1.8 million to secure a contract for the sale of aircraft and, ultimately, resulted in the Prime
Minister’s arrest and conviction for securities fraud.16
9

Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation:
The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489,
499 (2011).
10
See William Magnuson, International Corporate Bribery and Unilateral
Enforcement, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 360, 380 (2013) (discussing the history and events leading up to the enactment of the FCPA).
11
Westbrook, supra note 9, at 499-500.
12
H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977) (Comm. Rep).
13
See id. at 4-5.
14
GEORGE C. GREANIAS & DUANE WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT 60 (1982).
15
H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, supra note 12, at 5.
16
Magnuson, supra note 10, at 380.
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Given the public outcry and threat to America’s foreign policy
position, the federal government was under intense pressure to take
action in an effort to restore America’s public image abroad and its
relations with other nations.17 On December 19, 1977, President
Jimmy Carter signed the FCPA, after it was approved by the Senate
in a voice vote and passed unanimously by the House of Representatives.18 The FCPA would serve as a warning sign to American businesses and the international community that the United States would
not tolerate corrupt practices by its corporations.
B. The Statute
The purpose of enacting the FCPA was to criminalize the payment of bribes to a foreign official in order to obtain or retain business. The FCPA is part of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
it is both a civil statute and a criminal statute.19 As such, the DOJ
and SEC have enforcement authority.20 The statute addresses foreign corruption through two means: (1) the anti-bribery provisions
and (2) the accounting provisions.21
1. Anti-Bribery Provisions
The anti-bribery provisions apply to three categories of persons
and entities: (1) “issuers”;22 (2) “any domestic concern,” which includes citizens, nationals, or residents of the United States and business entities, including corporations, organized in the United States
or having their principal places of business in the United States;23
and (3) “persons other than issuers or domestic concerns,” including
the officers, directors, employees or agents, acting on behalf of an
issuer, domestic concern, or person.24
17

GREANIAS, supra note 14, at 59.
Id. at 63.
19
Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of
Its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 395 (2010).
20
Id. at 395.
21
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S.
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 10 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guidance/guide.pdf [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE].
22
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012).
23
Id. § 78dd-2.
24
Id. § 78dd-3.
18
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The anti-bribery provisions prohibit a domestic concern “from
mak[ing] use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance” of a bribe “to any foreign
official” for the purpose of “influencing any act or decision of such
official in his official capacity . . . in order to assist such domestic
concern in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing
business to any person . . . .”25
The FCPA applies only to payments intended to influence a foreign official to use their position to obtain or retain business.26 This
business purpose test includes the payment of bribes to win a contract, influence the procurement process, gain access to non-public
bid tender information, etc.27 To violate the FCPA, the act of bribery
must be made with an intent or desire to wrongly influence the recipient.28 Because the FCPA focuses on the intent, there is no requirement that the corrupt act succeed in its purpose or that the foreign official solicit the bribe in order to be held criminally liable.29
For an individual defendant, criminal liability attaches only if he or
she acted “willfully,” with a bad purpose, and with knowledge that
the conduct was unlawful.30
The FCPA, however, permits three types of payments to foreign
officials: (1) facilitating, or grease, payments; (2) lawful payments
under the laws and regulations of the foreign official’s country; and
(3) promotional expenses.31
Facilitating payments do not come within the ambit of the FCPA
if made to a foreign official for the purpose of facilitating or expediting the performance of a routine government action.32 However,
routine government action excludes the decision of awarding new

25
Id. § 78dd-1(a)(1) (for issuers); id. § 78dd-2(a)(1) (for domestic concerns);
id. § 78dd-3(a)(1) (for persons other that issuers or domestic concerns).
26
RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 21, at 12.
27
See id. at 13.
28
Id. at 14.
29
Id.
30
Id. (noting that the government need not prove that the defendant was
aware and had knowledge of the FCPA).
31
Jared Chaykin, Note, U.S. v. Aguilar and the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act: Sending an S.O.S. to Congress, 44 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 63, 65
(2012).
32
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b).
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business or continued business with a party.33 Examples of routine
governmental action include obtaining permits or licenses, processing governmental papers, or providing police protection.34
Payments that are legal in the foreign official’s country may be
allowed. In using the affirmative defense that a payment is lawful in
the foreign country, it must be established that the law or regulation
is written—it is not enough to show that bribes are not prosecuted
under local law.35
Promotional expenses may also be paid for reasonable and bona
fide expenditures on behalf of a foreign official made for the purpose of promoting, demonstrating, or explaining products or services.36 Bona fide expenditures may include travel and lodging expenses for an official’s visit to company facilities, training, etc.37
However, promotional expenses do not include expenses for trips
that are primarily for personal entertainment purposes, and family
members and spouses cannot attend any of the trips for free.38
Bribes come in many forms. A bribe may be disguised as a “consulting fee,” an internship opportunity for a child in college, or a trip
primarily for touristic purposes. The FCPA does not have a de minimis threshold because what may be a modest payment in the United
States might be a more substantial gift in a foreign country.39 Regardless of the size of the gift, the influencing party must have the
corrupt intent to influence the foreign official.40 This protects the
person making the gift from liability for providing items of nominal
value or small tokens of esteem or gratitude.41

33

Id. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(B).
RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 21, at 25.
35
Id. at 23.
36
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)(2)(A).
37
FCPA Op. Release 07-02 (Dep’t of Justice Sep. 11, 2007); FCPA Op. Release 07-01 (Dep’t of Justice Jul. 24, 2007); FCPA Op. Release 04-01 (Dep’t of
Justice Jan. 6, 2004); RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 21, at 24.
38
See generally FCPA Op. Release 07-02 (Dep’t of Justice Sep. 11, 2007);
FCPA Op. Release 07-01 (Dep’t of Justice Jul. 24, 2007).
39
RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 21, at 15.
40
Id.
41
Id.
34
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2. Accounting Provisions
Congress enacted the FCPA’s accounting provisions as an additional layer of protection against bribery because American companies are able to conceal most of their illicit bribes in their corporate
books.42 The FCPA’s accounting provisions apply to every issuer
under the Exchange Act that has a class of securities registered pursuant to Section 12 or that is required to file periodic reports pursuant to Section 15(d).43 These provisions apply to any issuer that
trades in a national securities exchange in the United States; however, they do not apply to private companies.44 The accounting provisions have two components: the record keeping requirement45 and
the internal controls requirement.46
The record keeping element requires all issuers to “make and
keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the
assets of the issuer . . . .”47 Under the record-keeping requirement,
liability would attach, even if all the elements of the anti-bribery
provisions were not met, if improper payments are not accurately
recorded.48 Bribes are often mischaracterized as commissions or
royalties, consulting fees, travel and entertainment expenses, writeoffs, etc.49 As such, the record keeping requirement serves three purposes: it (1) ensures that illegal transactions are recorded; (2) prevents the falsification of records to conceal illegal transactions; and
(3) promotes the proper characterization of transactions.50
The internal control element requires that issuers

42
See Andrea Dahms & Nicolas Mitchell, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 44
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 605, 610 n.16 (2007) (discussing the accounting and anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA as well as the penalties for their violations).
43
RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 21, at 42-43.
44
Id.
45
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2012).
46
Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
47
Id. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
48
RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 21, at 39.
49
See id.
50
Bartle et al., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1265,
1270-71 (2014) (examining the elements of the accounting provisions).
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[D]evise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that transactions are executed in accordance
with management’s general or specific authorization;
transactions are recorded as necessary to permit
preparation of financial statements in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles . . .
and to maintain accountability for assets . . . .51
The FCPA does not specify what controls a company must implement, and this allows for the flexibility to develop controls that
are appropriate to the company’s needs and circumstances.52 Internal controls may include the tone set by management regarding ethics, risk assessments, control measures that cover policies and procedures, and monitoring.53
C. Judicial Interpretation
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its internal investigations requirement have resulted in an increase in the number of FCPA violations
that have been discovered.54 In addition, the DOJ and SEC have increased the number of individuals prosecuted under the FCPA and
held corporate officers accountable in an effort to deter foreign bribery.55 Mark Mendelsohn, the DOJ’s chief FCPA prosecutor stated,
The number of individual prosecutions has risen –
and that’s not an accident. That is quite intentional
on the part of the Department. It is our view that to
have a credible deterrent effect, people have to go to

51

15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 21, at 40.
53
Id.
54
Chaykin, supra note 31, at 67.
55
Id.; Koehler, supra note 19, at 404 (noting that the DOJ, operating under
the belief that an individual who loses his or her liberty is a far greater deterrent
than a corporation paying a hefty fine, has made the prosecution of individual
FCPA violators the cornerstone of its enforcement strategy).
52
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jail. People have to be prosecuted where appropriate.
This is a federal crime. This is not fun and games.56
Critics of the FCPA contend that the Act is vague and too wide
in scope.57 Arguably, the greatest source of contention is determining who constitutes a “foreign official.” The difficulty in identifying
a “foreign official” stems from the fact that it requires defining the
term “instrumentality.” Although the FCPA defines the term “public
international organization,”58 it does not contain a definition for “instrumentality.” In the absence of a definition, the DOJ and SEC have
interpreted the term “foreign official” broadly to include not only
government officials and agents but also employees of foreign stateowned or controlled corporations.59 The DOJ and SEC have deemed
such individuals, regardless of rank or title or classification under
the local foreign law, to be “foreign officials” because their employers are an “instrumentality” of a foreign government and irrespective of the fact that the employer is a company with publicly traded
stock or has characteristics of a private enterprise.60 This element
singlehandedly determines the scope of enforcement of the statute.
In light of the increase in enforcement of the FCPA, individuals
and corporations argue that there is a lack of guidance from the
agencies and the courts.61 The DOJ has generally been reluctant to
issue advisory opinions, and since 1993, it has only issued thirtyeight advisory opinions concerning the FCPA.62 The lack of guidance is compounded further by the fact that courts have played a
minimal role in interpreting the FCPA.63 The dearth of case law is
rooted in the fact that every large entity that has faced FCPA proceedings has entered into a settlement agreement with the government to include non-prosecution agreements, deferred prosecution
56
Richard L. Cassin, The FCPA Isn’t Fun and Games, THE FCPA BLOG
(Sept. 16, 2008, 7:28 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2008/9/16/the-fcpaisnt-fun-and-games.html.
57
Chaykin, supra note 31, at 68.
58
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(B).
59
Bartle, supra note 50, at 1280; Koehler, supra note 19, at 391.
60
Koehler, supra note 19, at 391-92.
61
Chaykin, supra note 31, at 69.
62
See Opinion Procedure Releases, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/ (last updated June 17, 2015).
63
Chaykin, supra note 31, at 70.
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agreements, and other settlements that are not subject to scrutiny by
the judiciary.64 For obvious reasons, a business would rather pay
substantial fees than face the negative consequences that it could
encounter upon losing a FCPA challenge.65 As a result, the courts
have rarely been given the opportunity to interpret the FCPA, and
the DOJ and SEC have been given carte blanche to define its scope
and enforce at will.66
The increase in individual prosecutions has yielded a variety of,
albeit a few, statutory interpretation arguments to determine whether
a state owned or controlled entity is an instrumentality under the
FCPA. Such arguments have attempted to discern the FCPA’s
meaning of an “instrumentality” through the statutory text, legislative history, and the purpose of the statute.
In United States v. Nguyen, four individuals and a company,
Nexus Technologies, Inc., were charged with bribing various Vietnamese government officials in exchange for contracts to supply
government agencies with equipment and technology.67 Over the
course of the scheme, the defendants paid upwards of $150,000 in
bribes to Vietnamese officials.68 The defendants negotiated contracts and bribes with the officials of the Vietnamese government,
negotiated with vendors in the United States, and arranged for the
transfer of funds for a wide variety of equipment and technology—
including underwater mapping equipment, bomb containment
equipment, and helicopter parts.69
In United States v. Carson, the DOJ charged six executives with
conspiracy to secure contracts by paying bribes to officials of for-

64
Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Michael J. Koehler in Support of Petitioners at 4, United States v. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 2014) (No. 14189).
65
Brief of Washington Legal Foundation and the Independence Institute as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 7, United States v. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d
912 (11th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-189).
66
See id.
67
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Philadelphia Export Company and Employees Indicted for Paying Bribes to Foreign Officials (Sept. 5, 2008), available
at http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/September/08-crm-782.html.
68
Id.
69
Id.
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eign state-owned energy companies as well as officers and employees of foreign and domestic private companies.70 From 2003 through
2007, the defendants paid $4.9 million in bribes to officials of foreign state-owned corporations.71 The payments were made to officials of state-owned entities in China, Malaysia, Korea, and the
United Arab Emirates in the form of lavish vacations, tuition payments, and expensive gifts for the purpose of securing business.72
In United States v. Aguilar, the defendants were indicted for
their roles in a conspiracy to pay bribes to Mexican government officials at the Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE), a state-owned
utility company.73 Angela and Enrique Aguilar were hired by Lindsey Manufacturing Company to be sales representatives in Mexico;
in compensation, the company would allegedly pay a 30 percent
commission based on the revenue realized as a result of its contracts
with CFE.74 As part of the agreement, the government alleged that
all or part of the commission would be used to pay bribes to CFE
officials in exchange for awarding Lindsey Manufacturing contracts.75 In an interesting turn of events, in December 2011, after a
jury trial that resulted in the conviction of the defendants, the Honorable A. Howard Matz granted the defense’s motion to vacate the
defendants’ convictions and dismissed the indictment on the
grounds of prosecutorial misconduct.76
70
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Six Former Executives of California Valve
Company Charged in $46 Million Foreign Bribery Conspiracy (Apr. 8, 2009),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/six-former-executives-californiavalve-company-charged-46-million-foreign-bribery-conspiracy.
71
Id.
72
Indictment at 6-7, United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-0077 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 8, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalfraud/legacy/2013/05/06/04-08-09carson-indict.pdf.
73
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Two Intermediaries Indicted for Their Alleged Participation in Scheme To Bribe Officials at State-Owned Electrical Utility
in Mexico (Sept. 15, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-intermediaries-indicted-their-alleged-participation-scheme-bribe-officials-stateowned.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Aguilar, No. CR 1001031(A)-AHM (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2012/06/25/2011-12-01-aguilare-order-granting-motion-to-dismiss.pdf.
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1. Textual Arguments and Analysis
In its motion to dismiss, the defense in Carson argued that in the
absence of an express definition, the court must give the word its
ordinary meaning.77 Arguing that a dictionary definition of “instrumentality” does not help to ascertain the word’s ordinary meaning,
the court must consider the word as it is used in the statute.78 In doing so, the defense concluded that the term “instrumentality” does
not include state-owned enterprises; instead, the term includes governmental units and subdivisions like boards, commissions, and
other similar governmental entities.79
In Aguilar, the defendants contended in their motion to dismiss
that under the two canons of construction—noscitur a sociis and
ejusdem generis—an instrumentality of the government is an entity
used by the government to set forth and administer public policy or
exercise political authority.80 Under the canon of noscitur a sociis,
words are to be judged by their context and words in a series are to
be understood by neighboring words in the series.81 Under ejusdem
generis, general words that follow specific words are to be construed
to embrace objects that are similar to those objects enumerated by
the preceding specific words82 As such, the defendants argued that
the term “instrumentality” was limited to the characteristics of a “department” or “agency.”83
In addition, the Carson defendants argued that where Congress
has intended the term “instrumentality” to include state-owned enterprises, it has explicitly done so and required substantial or majority ownership.84 For example, in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
77

Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Counts One Through
Ten of the Indictment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof
at 11, Carson, No. SACR 09-0077 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Carson
Motion to Dismiss].
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Id. at 11-12.
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Id. at 2, 12.
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Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss the First Superseding
Indictment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; [Proposed] Order (Filed Under Separate Cover) at 8-9, Aguilar, No. CR 10-01031(A)-AHM (C.D. Cal. Feb.
28, 2011) [hereinafter Aguilar Motion to Dismiss].
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United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1113 n.5 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
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Id. at 9.
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Carson Motion to Dismiss, supra note 77, at 30.

398

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:2

Act (FSIA), “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state means any
entity . . . which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof.”85 In the
Economic Espionage Act, “the term ‘foreign instrumentality’ means
any agency, bureau, ministry, component, institution, association, or
any legal commercial, or business organization, corporation, firm,
or entity that is substantially owned, controlled, sponsored, commanded, managed, or dominated by a foreign government.”86
In Nguyen, the defense argued in its motion to dismiss that if the
anti-bribery provisions were to apply to certain entities by virtue of
government control, the requirement would have been included as
an explicit criterion—as is included in the accounting provision.87
The defendants contended that the accounting provision of the
FCPA includes a criterion to determine the concept of control and
liability for corporate owners.88 Under the accounting provision,
“where an issuer . . . holds 50 per centum or less of the voting power
with respect to a domestic or foreign firm, . . . the issuer [shall] proceed in good faith to use its influence to cause such domestic or foreign firm to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting
controls.”89 While there is an explicit control element in the accounting provision, no such control element exists for the anti-bribery
provision. Consequently, the existence of an explicit control element
in the accounting provision is indicative of the fact that the FCPA is
to apply to certain foreign entities by virtue of governmental control.90
2. Congressional Intent Arguments and Analysis
In Carson, the defendants argued that Congress did not intend to
enact statutory language that it had previously rejected.91 In 1976,
85

Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (2012).
Carson Motion to Dismiss, supra note 77, at 31; 18 U.S.C. § 1839.
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Motion to Dismiss Superseding Indictment for Failure to State a Criminal
Offense and for Vagueness at 16, United States v. Nguyen, No. 08-522 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Nguyen Motion to Dismiss].
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Id.
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15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6).
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Nguyen Motion to Dismiss, supra note 87, at 16.
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Carson Motion to Dismiss, supra note 77, at 27.
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S. 3741 was introduced in the Senate by Senator Warren Magnuson
and H.R. 15149 was introduced in the House by Representative Harley Staggers to address foreign corporate payments.92 In each bill,
“foreign government” was defined to include, among other things,
“a corporation or other legal entity established or owned by, and
subject to control by, a foreign government.”93 The American Bar
Association advised Representative John Murphy, Chairman of the
House Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance, who
was holding hearings on S. 3741 and H.R. 15149, that the portion of
the “foreign government” definition referring to “a corporation or
other legal entity established or owned by, and subject to control by,
a foreign government” was ambiguous and suggested a more precise
alternative: “a legal entity which a foreign government owns or controls as though an owner.”94
Further, in 1977, Representative Frederick Rooney introduced
H.R. 7543.95 Similarly, “foreign government” was defined to include “a corporation or other legal entity established, owned, or subject to managerial control by a foreign government.”96 In 1977, Congress passed S. 305, the bill that ultimately became the FCPA.97 S.
305 did not include a definition that included mention of stateowned enterprises, and by extension, Congress did not intend sub
silentio to enact statutory language that it had discarded earlier in
favor of other language.98
In Nguyen and Aguilar, the defendants argued that Congress
amended the FCPA in 1998 to bring it into compliance with the Or92

Id. at 26; Declaration of Professor Michael J. Koehler in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts One Through Ten of the Indictment at 53,
United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-0077 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Koehler Declaration]; S. 3741, 94th Cong. § 2(e) (1976); H.R. 15149, 94th
Cong. §§ 2(e) & (h) (1976).
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Carson Motion to Dismiss, supra note 77, at 26; Koehler Declaration, supra note 92, at 6.
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Carson Motion to Dismiss, supra note 77, at 27; Koehler Declaration, supra note 92, at 59-60.
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Carson Motion to Dismiss, supra note 77, at 26; Koehler Declaration, supra note 92, at 79.
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ganization for Economic Co-Operation Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International
Business Transactions.99 The Convention defines a “foreign public
official” as
any person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country, whether appointed
or elected; any person exercising a public function
for a foreign country, including for a public agency
or public enterprise; and any official or agent of a
public international organisation.100
The Commentaries on the Convention explicitly define “public
enterprise” as
any enterprise, regardless of its legal form, over
which a government, or governments, may directly
or indirectly, exercise a dominant influence. This is
deemed to be the case, inter alia, when the government or governments hold the majority of the enterprise’s subscribed capital, control the majority of
votes attaching to shares issued by the enterprise or
can appoint a majority of the enterprise’s administrative or managerial body or supervisory board.101
As included in the OECD Convention, Congress expanded the
definition of a foreign official to include “public international organizations.”102 However, Congress did not expand the definition to
include employees of entities that are controlled or indirectly owned
by a government—also included in the OECD Convention.103 Despite all the amendments Congress made to the FCPA, Congress did
99

Aguilar Motion to Dismiss, supra note 80, at 19; Nguyen Motion to Dismiss, supra note 84, at 14.
100
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International
Business Transactions, art. I, ¶ 4(a), Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter
OECD Convention].
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Id. at Commentaries, ¶ 14.
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Aguilar Motion to Dismiss, supra note 80, at 20; Nguyen Motion to Dismiss, supra note 87, at 14.
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not bring the FCPA into strict conformity with the Convention.104
Because Congress had never expressly included state-operated corporations as part of the FCPA, and Congress did not intend to include employees of businesses that were controlled or indirectly
owned by a foreign government as a foreign official, Congress never
intended to criminalize payments to state-owned corporations.105
3. Purposive Arguments and Analysis
The defendants in Nguyen argued that the purpose of the FCPA
was to criminalize the payment of bribes to public officials, politicians, and political parties.106 The defense argued that under the
FCPA, an instrumentality must perform a government or public
function, rather than a commercial one.107 The illicit payments were
made to employees of Vietnamese entities, which included a Vietnamese airline, an aviation industry business, and several petroleum
industry companies.108 Consequently, the defendants urged that the
entities employing the Vietnamese officials did not employ foreign
officials under the FCPA because the entities were commercial and
something more than ultimate ownership or control by the government was required.109 To conclude otherwise would yield overbroad
results and would not be in accordance with the purpose of the statute.110 In countries where government ownership and control is pervasive, such as in communist countries, a definition without a government function requirement would result in an entire nation populated by “foreign officials.”111 In the United States, companies such
as AIG, Lockheed Martin, and General Motors would be instrumentalities of the United States’ government—a result that would be inconsistent with the purpose of criminalizing public bribery under the
FCPA.112
104
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Ultimately, the Nguyen court denied the defendants’ motion in
one sentence and failed to provide any analysis.113 The Carson court
concluded that “the statutory language of the FCPA is clear, that the
statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, and the resort to the
legislative history of the FCPA is unnecessary.”114 It also proposed
several non-exclusive, non-dispositive factors that bear on the question of whether a business entity is a government instrumentality:
The foreign state’s characterization of the entity and
its employees; [t]he foreign state’s degree of control
over the entity; [t]he purpose of the entity’s activities; [t]he entity’s obligations and privileges under
the foreign state’s law, including whether the entity
exercises exclusive or controlling power to administer its designated functions; [t]he circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation; and [t]he foreign
state’s extent of ownership of the entity, including
the level of financial support by the state (e.g., subsidies, special tax treatment, and loans).115
Similarly, the Aguilar court rejected the defendants’ argument
and instead, posited broad characteristics held by government agencies and departments that qualify as instrumentalities: (1) entity provides a service to the citizens; (2) key officers and directors of the
entity are, or are appointed by, government officials; (3) entity is
predominantly financed by the government fisc; (4) entity is vested
with and exercises exclusive or controlling power to administer its
designated functions; and (5) entity is widely perceived to perform
official government functions.116
III.
UNITED STATES V. ESQUENAZI
In December 2009, Joel Esquenazi and Carlos Rodriguez were
indicted on twenty-one counts for their participation in a scheme to
commit foreign bribery and money laundering from November 2001
113

Order, United States v. Nguyen, No. 08-522 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2009).
United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at
*8 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011).
115
Id. at *3-4.
116
United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
114

SUMMER 2016]

UNITED STATES V. ESQUENAZI

403

through March 2005.117 Esquenazi and Rodriguez owned Terra Telecommunications, which purchased phone minutes from foreign
vendors and then sold those minutes to customers in the United
States; Telecommunications D’Haiti was one of Terra Telecommunications’ main vendors.118 In 2001, Terra Telecommunications executed a contract to buy minutes directly from Telecommunications
D’Haiti, whose Director General was Patrick Joseph (appointed by
Haiti’s then President Jean-Bertrand Aristide) and Director of International Relations was Robert Antoine.119 By October 2011, Terra
Telecommunications owed Telecommunications D’Haiti over
$400,000, so Esquenazi negotiated a deal with Antoine that provided side payments in exchange for reducing Terra Telecommunications’ debt.120
In April 2003, following a change in management by President
Aristide, Jean Rene Duperval succeeded to Antoine’s position. Esquenazi formed a shell company, Telecom Consulting Services, to
funnel side payments to Duperval.121 The shell company’s president
was Duperval’s sister, Margurite Grandison, and Terra Telecommunications made seven payments totaling $75,000 to Telecom Consulting Services.122 Esquenazi and Rodriguez pled not guilty to all
twenty-one counts.123
In Esquenazi’s motion to dismiss, he argued that the FCPA does
not apply to an employee of an entity merely because the entity is
controlled by a department, agency, or instrumentality of a foreign
government or is partially owned by a foreign government.124 Esquenazi argued that the statute was ambiguous because it failed to
117
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define an instrumentality.125 He further argued that when a statute is
unclear, courts should use canons of statutory construction to determine Congress’ intent and give it effect.126
Analyzing the statute’s plain text, Esquenazi reasoned that a definition of the term “instrumentality” which included an entity controlled or partially owned by a department, agency, or instrumentality, would run afoul with the ordinary meaning and ultimate purpose
of the statute; instead, a definition of the term “instrumentality”
should include an element of performance of a government function.127 Because the text of the statute was less than instructive, Esquenazi argued that the court should look to Congress’ intent.128
The defense contended that Congress’ purpose in enacting the
FCPA was to criminalize corporate bribery of foreign officials, politicians, and political parties.129 By looking at the “mischief and defect” the statute was meant to remedy, a definition of “instrumentality” that would best give the statute the effect intended by Congress
would be to include a concept of government function.130 The defense repurposed the argument used in Nguyen, which analyzed the
use of “instrumentality” in similar statutes such as the FSIA and the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).131 Using the FSIA, the defense argued that a majority ownership by a foreign state is the benchmark of instrumentality status.132 Using
ERISA, the defense argued that whether an entity is an instrumentality hinges on whether the entity performs a governmental function
rather than involving primarily private interests.133 Accordingly, the
FSIA and ERISA characterize instrumentalities as entities that serve
a public function.134
Esquenazi argued that mere control by a foreign government is
insufficient to extend the ambit of the FCPA.135 Again, repurposing
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
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133
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a Nguyen argument, the defense argued that the accounting provision included a control test for establishing liability of corporate
owners; however, no such test existed for the establishment of an
instrumentality, which is indicative of Congress’ intent to provide a
control element to one portion of the statute and not to the other.136
If Congress intended for the determination of an “instrumentality”
to be determined by the mere existence of control, it would have
included a control test like the one found in the accounting provision.137
It was further argued that the FCPA was amended to conform to
the OECD Convention, which defines a “foreign public official” as
“any person exercising a public function for a foreign country.”138
Congress, however, did not amend the FCPA to include application
to employees of government-controlled enterprises.139 Congress’
decision not to revise the meaning of “instrumentality” while implementing the Convention is indicative of Congress’ intent to require
more than government control to establish FCPA liability.140
Also borrowing from Nguyen, Esquenazi argued that under the
doctrine of ejusdem generis, an “instrumentality,” which follows
“agency” and “department” in the statute, must perform a function
similar to functions performed by a government agency or department.141 Unfortunately, the court disagreed with Esquenazi’s arguments, and it denied his motion to dismiss.142 In its order, the court
found that the United States successfully alleged that Antoine and
Duperval were foreign officials of state-owned Haiti Teleco.143
Without any substantiation or reasoning, the court concluded that it
disagreed with Esquenazi’s contention that Haiti Teleco could not
be an instrumentality under the FCPA’s definition of a “foreign official” because the plain language and plain meaning of the statute
136
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showed that as alleged in the indictment, Haiti Teleco could be an
instrumentality of the Haitian government.144
During trial, the United States successfully presented evidence
to establish that Telecommunications D’Haiti had significant ties to
the government of Haiti. An expert witness, Luis Gary Lissade, testified that Telecommunications D’Haiti was formed in 1968, and at
its inception, the government appointed two members of its board
of directors.145 The expert further testified that during the 1970s, the
National Bank of Haiti acquired 97% ownership of Telecommunications D’Haiti, and afterwards, the Haitian President appointed all
of its board of directors.146 In the expert’s ultimate opinion, Telecommunications D’Haiti belonged “totally to the state” and “was
considered . . . a public entity.”147
A jury found Esquenazi and Rodriguez guilty on all counts.148
Esquenazi and Rodriguez appealed their conviction to the Eleventh
Circuit arguing that Telecommunications D’Haiti was not an instrumentality of the Haitian government because it did not provide traditional, core government functions and that the FCPA was unconstitutionally vague.149 The central question in the appeal was
whether Telecommunications D’Haiti was an instrumentality of the
government of Haiti under the FCPA. The Eleventh Circuit responded in the affirmative.150
In the first appellate decision to address the meaning of “instrumentality,” the Eleventh Circuit defined “instrumentality” as “an entity controlled by the government of a foreign country that performs
a function the controlling government treats as its own.”151 In terms
of plain meaning, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the word “instrumentality” is subject to multiple meanings.152 As such, the court
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turned to other methods of statutory construction—including noscitur a sociis.153 Using the noscitur a sociis doctrine, the court gleaned
that an instrumentality must be under the control or dominion of the
government and must be doing the business of the government to
qualify as an “instrumentality” under the FCPA.154
In an examination of another portion of the FCPA, the court
looked at the “grease payment” exception to FCPA liability.155 The
court noted that the FCPA’s definition of “routine governmental action” explicitly included the provision of phone service, rejecting
Esquenazi’s and Rodriguez’s contention that a government-controlled entity engaged in a commercial service cannot be an instrumentality under the FCPA.156
Turning to an analysis of the 1998 amendment to the FCPA, the
court examined the United States’ ratification of the OECD Convention and the subsequent FCPA amendment.157 The court noted that
the OECD Convention defines a “foreign public official” as including “any person exercising a public function for a foreign country,
including for a . . . public enterprise” as well as to agents of “any
public international organization.”158 However, Congress only
added the “public international organization” component to the
FCPA.159 To that, the court deduced that Congress must have felt
that the pre-existing definition of a foreign official already covered
a government-controlled enterprise.160 Any other interpretation, the
court concluded, would find the United States in conflict with our
treaty obligations—in contradiction of the Charming Betsy doctrine,
which requires that federal statutes be interpreted so as to avoid conflict with international law.161
The appellate court noted that a “usual” or “proper” government
function changes over time and varies from one country to the
next.162 To offer guidance, the court defined an “instrumentality”
153
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under the FCPA as “an entity controlled by the government of a foreign country that performs a function the controlling government
treats as its own.”163 The court elaborated on what constitutes “control” with five factors to consider:
[1] the foreign government’s formal designation of
that entity; [2] whether the government has a majority interest in the entity; [3] the government’s ability
to hire and fire the entity’s principals; [4] the extent
to which the entity’s profits, if any, go directly into
the government’s fisc, and, by the same token, the
extent to which the government funds the entity if it
fails to break even; [5] the length of time these indicia have existed.164
The court also elaborated as to what constitutes “a function the
controlling government treats as its own” with four factors to consider:
[1] whether the entity has a monopoly over the function it exists to carry out; [2] whether the government
subsidizes the costs associated with the entity providing services; [3] whether the entity provides services
to the public at large in the foreign country; [4] and
whether the public and the government of that foreign country generally perceive the entity to be performing a government function.165
Both sets of factors are not meant to be exhaustive, but are to be
considered by the courts when engaging in a fact-based inquiry.166
Esquenazi and Rodriguez appealed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court.167 The Supreme Court denied Esquenazi
and Rodriguez’s petition.168 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision will
163
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have a significant impact on how business is transacted around the
world and with businesses that have varying degrees of governmental control. All in all, the court proposed nine factors to be considered and weighed.
IV.
ANALYSIS
The Eleventh Circuit in Esquenazi stepped up to the challenge
of clarifying the “foreign official” element of the FCPA: is a stateowned enterprise an instrumentality for the purpose of delineating
the scope of the statute? Unfortunately, the court fell into a trap that
lower courts have fallen into. Rather than dealing with the issue of
whether a state-owned enterprise constitutes an “instrumentality”
head on, the court dwelled on the fact that the determination is an
issue of fact. In its opinion, the court propounded a multi-factor test.
Actually, as if the issue were not sufficiently complicated, it propounded two multi-factor tests. One was to determine if the foreign
government exerted control over the entity. The other was to determine if the entity provided a function that the foreign government
treated as its own. All in all, the court propounded nine non-dispositive factors and zero guidance on how the factors should be applied.
Although Esquenazi was a major victory for the DOJ, this totality of the circumstances approach further muddles the issue. Esquenazi has also broadened the scope greatly—even beyond what
the enacting Congress intended. The broadened scope is critically
important because it affects businesses and individuals that engage
in international commerce. However, the case provides little guidance to the business community, failing to provide any notice as to
when their interaction with a state-owned entity would run afoul of
the FCPA. As a result, businesses and individuals transacting business in the international arena must curtail their legitimate business
activities or implement extreme prophylactic measures in an overabundance of caution to inoculate themselves against FCPA liability.
A. Broadened Scope
In interpreting a statute, courts should start with the text of a
statute and ask what the text would mean to an ordinary speaker of
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the language.169 The use of textual sources to aid in the discernment
of a word’s ordinary meaning is admissible and includes dictionaries, grammar books, surveys of linguistic practice, and the interpreter’s own sense of ordinary usage.170 Using dictionaries as tools,
the court analyzed Black’s Law Dictionary171 and Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary.172 However, the court ultimately concluded that the dictionary definitions did not provide a complete answer.173 As a matter of fact, the court had previously acknowledged
that “instrumentality” was susceptible to multiple meanings.174
The court then turned to the noscitur a sociis canon of statutory
construction. Under this canon of statutory construction, when
words are grouped together and ordinarily have similar meanings,
then general words are limited and qualified by the special words in
the group.175 The FCPA prohibits any payments to an “officer or
employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or
instrumentality thereof . . . .”176 Here, using noscitur a sociis, “department” and “agency” are the special words, and “instrumentality”
is the general word. It is highly likely that Congress intended for
instrumentalities to consist of entities more similar to regulatory
bodies, like the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or entities
that provide unique governmental functions, like the Department of
the Treasury. By extension, Congress likely intended for instrumentalities to include independent entities with a body of governance,
like the National Labor Review Board.
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Instead, in its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit determined that because departments and agencies are under the control of the government and conduct the business of the government, then an instrumentality must likewise be under the control or dominion of the government and engage in the business of the government to be an instrumentality under the FCPA.177 The court’s superficial analysis
lends itself to a number of similar, and equally as faulty, conclusions. The court did not quantify how much control or what functions were necessary to constitute an “instrumentality.” The nine
factors promoted by the court do not offer any guidance.
In furthering its analysis, the court analyzed the grease payment
provision, which specifically provides for the inclusion of phone
service as a “routine governmental action.”178 Using this provision,
the court rejected the defendants’ contention that a government-controlled entity that provides a commercial service cannot automatically be an instrumentality. The court’s conclusion ignores the fact
that Congress may have intended for there to be a threshold for the
inclusion of an enterprise as an instrumentality. Would Congress
have included a phone service provider that is 1% owned by the
government? It would certainly be government-controlled and
would be carrying on in the business of the government. What about
10% or 51% share of control by the government?
Further, the court declined to engage in an analysis under the
ejusdem generis canon of statutory construction, explaining that the
canon does not apply when the term at issue is not a general term
following a list of specific items. 179 The court relied on the fact that
the word preceding “instrumentality” is “any” rather than “other,”
which, in its opinion, does not make the term a generalized catchall.
The court’s reliance is flawed. In its explanation, the court compares the statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B) to that of
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(1)(B). In both statutes, the word “any” precedes the word “instrumentality.” While the word “other” also precedes the word instrumentality in 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B), and not
in the FCPA provision in question, the reasoning for not giving due
consideration to the doctrine of ejusdem generis is baseless. Had
ejusdem generis been considered, the court would have come to the
177
178
179
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conclusion that “instrumentality” embraces the same entities as
those in a “department” or “agency.”
The court proceeded to engage in an analysis of the legislative
history. Curiously, however, the court begins its analysis with the
1998 amendment to the FCPA. It completely disregarded the legislative history of the FCPA’s enactment, which is quite instructive.
In 1977, after several years of investigations and hearings, Congress passed the FCPA and enacted a statute that prohibited corrupt
payments to public officials overseas. Prior to that, some of the bills
introduced before the enactment of the FCPA explicitly included
state-owned enterprises under the ambit of the FCPA. Two bills in
particular defined “foreign government” to include “a corporation
or other legal entity established or owned by, and subject to control
by, a foreign government.”180 Later, in June 1977, a bill was introduced in the House, and it defined “foreign government” to include
“a corporation or other legal entity established, owned, or subject to
managerial control by a foreign government.”181 From the bills that
were proposed, it is evident that Congress was aware of the existence of government-controlled enterprises and their possible role in
foreign corruption; however, Congress did not act.
In 1998, in an effort to conform the FCPA to the OECD Convention, Congress passed an amendment to the FCPA. Unfortunately, Congress fell short yet again. Although it is relatively well
known that subsequent legislative history is less authoritative than
committee reports and rejected bills, the Eleventh Circuit relied almost exclusively on the 1998 Amendment. The OECD Convention
defines a “foreign public official” as “any person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country, whether
appointed or elected; any person exercising a public function for a
foreign country, including for a public agency or public enterprise;
and any official or agent of a public organisation . . . .”182
In the 1998 Amendment, Congress amended the FCPA to include the “public organisation” component of the OECD Convention, making it explicitly clear that public organizations were within
the scope of the statute. However, it would be a gross overstatement
180
181
182
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to say that the 1998 amendment brought the FCPA into strict conformance with the OECD Convention. The OECD Convention is
not a self-executing treaty, as it requires legislative action to be
given effect in the United States. If it was Congress’ intent to include
government-owned enterprises under the ambit of the FCPA, it
should have explicitly included such language into the amendment
as it did for international public organizations. Congress had the opportunity to do so in 1977 and again in 1998. To assume and draw
inferences where there are none takes away from intent of the enacting Congress.
The court also failed to look to other statutes where the word
“instrumentality” was used for guidance. Had the court looked to
statutes such as the FSIA, 183 it would have applied a narrower interpretation than what it established. Enacted one year before the
FCPA, the FSIA defines “an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state” as an entity that is “a separate legal person or otherwise” and
“which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof,
or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned
by a foreign or political subdivision thereof.”184
The court had an opportunity to properly quash the issue by establishing a bright-line rule, which would require a certain percentage of ownership or control, or, in the alternative, refuse to apply the
government’s argument absent the clear language present in the
OECD Convention. This is particularly so given the judicial vacuum
that exists by the very nature of the FCPA’s enforcement. Under the
court’s interpretation, just about any circumstance would allow for
a foreign government to control and treat any commercial enterprise
as its own; any percentage of governmental ownership would bring
a state-owned entity under the ambit of the FCPA.
Given the doctrines of statutory construction and the legislative
history of the FCPA, it is evident that the Eleventh Circuit has expanded the scope of the statute beyond its intended basis. Absent
any evidence or support that Congress intended to include government-controlled enterprises, the courts should err on the side of caution and interpret the statute narrowly. The factors proffered by the
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Eleventh Circuit are of little assistance as they do not help the individuals and businesses engaging in international trade gauge their
risk in transactions. Using the court’s factors and analysis, it is hard
to think of an enterprise that a foreign government is involved with
that would not fall under the scope of the FCPA as interpreted by
the Eleventh Circuit.
B. Effects of Ambiguity
We are living in an increasingly globalized world. The Internet
has greatly expanded the possibility of engaging in business between nations and continents. To that end, however, the FCPA has
created an unbearable level of uncertainty for individuals and businesses transacting business overseas. Leaving aside the possible due
process violations, attempting to abide by the unknown restrictions
of the FCPA has led to parties conducting business in an overabundance of caution to avoid prosecution. Esquenazi has done little to
ameliorate the ambiguity of the FCPA. In fact, the court’s interpretation of the statute has greatly expanded the scope of the statute and
will likely lead to an increase in prosecution—all with little guidance for individuals and businesses.
Many individuals and businesses have implemented anti-corruption programs to thwart the effects of the broadly interpreted statute.
However, an effective anti-corruption program does not come without significant costs. In a survey of 358 American and English companies, it was reported that 80% of U.S. companies have banned facilitating payments entirely.185 Twenty-three percent of U.S. companies said that they made the decision to walk away from doing
business in a country perceived to have a high rate of local corruption.186 An effective anti-corruption program can be the difference
between a fine and an aggressive prosecution. A growing number of
multinational companies have established anti-corruption programs
that have led to leverage when plea-bargaining. It is important to
note that it is not enough to simply have an anti-corruption pro-
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gram—a compliance culture must permeate the organization in order to effectively demonstrate to the DOJ its commitment to compliance.
An effective anti-corruption program consists of various components. The first of which is a clear anti-corruption policy. The organization must have written standards and procedures to identify
and prevent acts that violate the FCPA.187 This usually includes a
code of conduct as well as oversight from high-level personnel. To
be successful, management must be committed to compliance.
Risk assessments are another vital component of an anti-corruption program. Assessments help companies determine whether they
have adequate compliance measures in place.188 A risk assessment
allows a company to evaluate the compliance roles and activities of
directors, officers, and audit staff.189 The assessment also reviews
international operations, contracts, hiring/employment practices,
and due diligence in mergers and/or acquisitions.190
Hiring and employment practices are essential to promoting
compliance within the organization. Training of employees allows
the compliance program to infiltrate every layer of the organization,
making everyone aware of general ethics regulations. For those who
interact frequently with foreign officials, comprehensive training
pertaining to facilitating-payment exceptions is undertaken to debunk common myths. Additionally, confidential reporting removes
barriers that may exist in alerting upper management of possible
FCPA violations. Providing incentives for whistleblowing encourages employees to approach upper management or, if it exists, an
independent anti-corruption board committee.
One of the greatest risks companies face arises when merging
with or acquiring another company. Successor liability removes the
defense that the acquiring company does not assume the past sins of
the newly acquired company.191 Due diligence is pivotal in reducing
187
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the risk of prosecution under the FCPA subsequent to a merger or
acquisition. Among other things, the acquiring company should review documents and files of the target company in search of contracts with foreign governments, “gifts,” and lapses in internal controls.192 If at all possible, the acquiring company should obtain an
indemnification agreement to limit its liability after the acquisition.
If FCPA issues are revealed during the acquiring company’s due
diligence, it is important to establish a compliance program for the
newly acquired company at the outset.
In the event of a serious corruption charge, companies may initiate an internal investigation. If the allegation is sufficiently egregious, a company’s management may choose to hire outside counsel
to conduct its internal investigation or represent the company in a
DOJ investigation.193 The decision to conduct its own investigation
versus using outside counsel depends on the seriousness of the allegation, level of FCPA experience required, financial resources, or
who is involved.
How much does compliance cost? In 2013, Wal-Mart reported
that it had spent $73 million on FCPA-related expenses during the
first quarter.194 During the previous fiscal year, Wal-Mart had spent
$157 million dollars on FCPA matters.195 In the midst of an FCPA
investigation resulting from self-disclosure, Avon reportedly spent
$280 million on FCPA compliance.196 These figures do not include
subsequent criminal or civil fines. In 2014, Alcoa World Alumina
LLC pled guilty to one count of violating the FCPA and agreed to
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pay $384 million in criminal and civil fines as well as profit disgorgement to the SEC and DOJ.197 In 2011, engineering firm Kellogg Brown & Root LLC (KBR) plead guilty to four substantive
counts of violating the FCPA and agreed to pay a $402 million penalty.198
All in all, the cost of enforcement is quite exorbitant. Sadly, it is
required to safely engage in business overseas. Given the costs, it is
very unfair to have individuals and businesses take on the expense
of a robust compliance program to err on the side of caution simply
because the businesses cannot discern what a “foreign official” is
within the nine factors propounded by the Eleventh Circuit. When
taken in conjunction with the fact that companies are choosing to
abstain from doing business in certain countries, it is an unbearable
cost for individuals and businesses.
V.
CONCLUSION
Without a doubt, the FCPA’s definition of a foreign official is
ambiguous. Because the statute is criminal in nature and has the authority to implement lengthy prison sentences, it should be narrowly
construed. The Eleventh Circuit had the opportunity to clarify the
inherent ambiguity. However, it failed to do so. On the contrary, it
magnified the ambiguity with a number of factors to consider—none
of which are dispositive.
The Supreme Court has declined to hear Esquenazi’s or Rodriguez’s appeal. The proper scope of the FCPA remains unclear. The
only option that remains is legislative action. Individuals and companies simply cannot operate in a state of uncertainty given the prospect of imprisonment or fines.
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